Instability and the Incentives for Corruption by Campante, Filipe et al.
INSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION
FILIPE R. CAMPANTE, DAVIN CHOR AND QUOC-ANH DO
We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stabil-
ity, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a
model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two eﬀects: a
horizon eﬀect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to em-
bezzle more during his short window of opportunity, and a demand
eﬀect, by which the private sector is more willing to bribe stable in-
cumbents. The horizon eﬀect dominates at low levels of stability, be-
cause ﬁrms are unwilling to pay high bribes and unstable incumbents
have strong incentives to embezzle, whereas the demand eﬀect gains
salience in more stable regimes. Together, these two eﬀects generate a
non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between total corruption and
stability. On the empirical side, we ﬁnd a robust U-shaped pattern be-
tween country indices of corruption perception and various measures of
incumbent stability, including historically observed average tenures of
chief executives and governing parties: regimes that are very stable or
very unstable display higher levels of corruption when compared with
those in an intermediate range of stability. These results suggest that
minimizing corruption may require an electoral system that features
some re-election incentives, but with an eventual term limit.
1. INTRODUCTION
THIS PAPER investigates how political stability aﬀects the incentives of in-
cumbents to engage in corrupt behavior. At a basic level, access to public
oﬃce provides opportunities for extracting corruption rents, and the pos-
sibility of losing oﬃce naturally constrains an incumbent’s window of op-
portunity for doing so. In addition, many lucrative projects that generate
these rents, such as the exploitation of a natural resource or construction
contracts, often take time to deliver their full monetary returns, and can be
halted if the incumbent is removed or if the opposition has suﬃcient clout to
block the project. One would thus expect that an incumbent’s security of
tenure and his ability to marshal support for his favored projects, both
crucial components of political stability, should be key in determining his
willingness and ability to extract these rents.1 We tackle this relationship
between incumbent stability and corruption from both theoretical and em-
pirical perspectives.
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1Note that we do not limit our concept of stability to the violent or unconstitutional removal
of the incumbent, as is often the narrower use of the term ‘‘political instability.’’
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As a conceptual starting point, it is important to recognize that the term
‘‘corruption’’ encompasses a wide range of related, but nevertheless distinct,
ways in which public oﬃcials may improperly derive private gain, such as
embezzling or misappropriating public funds, accepting kickbacks for favors
or licenses, or engaging in nepotism.2 A key insight of this paper is that poli-
tical stability can have contrasting eﬀects on diﬀerent forms of corrupt activity.
On the one hand, a lower level of stability shortens the incumbent’s
eﬀective decision-making horizon, which can lead to more corrupt behavior
along the lines of Olson’s (1991) ‘‘roving bandit.’’ An incumbent who is very
unstable would ﬁnd it optimal to steal more today instead of letting the pool
of resources accumulate into the future, given the uncertainty over whether
he will still be in power tomorrow. We can thus expect corruption in the
form of direct embezzlement – the diversion of public resources straight into
one’s pocket – to decrease as the incumbent’s position becomes more stable.
This horizon eﬀect can be thought of as a ‘‘supply’’-driven eﬀect, as it has to
do with the willingness of the public oﬃcial to supply or divert resources
toward corruption.3
On the other hand, other forms of corruption entail a long-term re-
lationship between the incumbent and a third party, for example when a
bribe is paid by a private ﬁrm for a resource concession that will take several
years to exploit. In this situation, the private sector’s willingness to pay
bribes actually increases with political stability, as businesses will be more
inclined to wheel-and-deal with an incumbent whose position they assess to
be more secure. Put otherwise, a stable regime is more conducive for an
incumbent and the private sector to develop the connections through which
the ﬂow of bribes will run. We dub this eﬀect the demand eﬀect, because it is
driven by the private sector’s demand for corruption.4
This paper’s ﬁrst point is to develop a model that formalizes the interplay
between these two eﬀects. In our setup, a self-interested incumbent makes an
optimal allocation of public resources to two diﬀerent forms of corrupt
activity, namely direct ‘‘embezzlement’’ and third-party ‘‘licensing.’’ (These
2Glaeser and Goldin (2006), Nye (1967), Rose-Ackerman (1999), and Svensson (2005) among
others have drawn similar distinctions on the diﬀerent manifestations of corruption. Olken
(2007) uncovers an interesting example of how incumbents appear to substitute between dif-
ferent forms of corruption. In a ﬁeld experiment involving road-building projects in Indonesia,
the use of an external audit led to a decrease in direct stealing of project funds, but resulted
instead in an increase in nepotism in hiring decisions related to the projects.
3This horizon eﬀect will be mitigated if there is a possibility that the incumbent can return to
power some time after being ousted. Such a political return will presumably be likelier when
there is more turnover and instability in the political environment. We have explored this
possibility in an extension using an inﬁnite-horizon Bellman approach, in which we ﬁnd that this
‘‘resurrection’’ eﬀect dampens the horizon eﬀect, but does not reverse it.
4The idea of modeling corruption as the outcome of demand and supply forces within an
unoﬃcial market is not new, with Shleifer and Vishny (1993) being a seminal piece. One con-
tribution of our paper is to analyze how political stability interacts with these demand–supply
eﬀects to inﬂuence the level of corruption.
labels serve as shorthand for the multiple types of activities typically re-
garded as corruption, with the main distinction being that ‘‘licensing’’ in-
volves an interaction with the private sector.) However, the incumbent’s
position is potentially unstable, in that there is some probability each period
that he will be ousted or that his policies will be blocked.
We show that the two aforementioned eﬀects combine to generate a non-
monotonic relationship between total corruption and stability that approx-
imates a U-shape. At low levels of stability, the horizon eﬀect unambiguously
prevails, and total corruption falls as the incumbent’s stability improves. On
the other hand, the demand eﬀect dominates in more stable regimes, leading
to a positive relationship between total corruption and stability over higher
ranges of the latter. The underlying logic is intuitive: the private sector is re-
luctant to bribe an unstable incumbent; hence, direct stealing will be the main
source of corruption revenues in highly unstable regimes. In the face of a small
increase in stability over this low range, the private sector remains pensive
about investing heavily in bribes, leaving the unstable incumbent with few
opportunities to substitute from embezzlement into licensing. This marginal
increase in stability therefore reduces total corruption because it lengthens the
incumbent’s expected horizon and directly decreases his incentive to embezzle.
However, over higher ranges of stability, bribery becomes more enticing, and
this opens the door for the demand eﬀect, because the prospect of long-term
deals raises the private sector’s demand for corruption. Corruption thus in-
creases with stability in relatively stable regimes, as long as the incumbent’s
ability to extract rents from the private sector is suﬃciently high so as to make
bribery an important source of corruption revenues.
The picture that emerges from our model is consistent with a lot of anec-
dotal evidence. On one end of the spectrum, countries such as Brazil (in the
early 1990s) and Pakistan have grappled with a combination of low stability
and high corruption. For example, Easterly (2003) surmises that ‘‘political
instability has made Pakistan’s successive governments more like Mancur
Olson’s (2000) ‘roving bandit’, who loots only for today’’ (p. 464). Con-
versely, autocratic regimes such as Mexico under the Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party (PRI), Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi, and Indonesia under
Suharto were stable for long periods, but saw extensive corruption as the
ruling elite exercised a monopoly over rent-seeking activities. Last but not
least, competitive democracies fall conveniently in the category of inter-
mediate stability and lower levels of corruption.5 We discuss in detail how
our theory is relevant for understanding individual countries’ experiences
with corruption with a pair of case studies, for Brazil and Mexico. These
5As further illustration, it has been suggested that the reason why the Baltic countries had a
better track record on corruption than other transition economies was that ‘‘because [their]
governments are [relatively] weak and fast-changing, they are also limited in their ability to
advance their ﬁnancial backers’ interests’’ (The Economist, December 11, 2004, p. 48). This is
precisely the spirit behind the demand eﬀect that we have outlined.
countries provide sharp illustrations of the horizon and demand eﬀects, with
observers having written about how corruption has ebbed and ﬂowed in
these countries as political stability has ﬂuctuated.
The paper’s second main point is empirical: we uncover a U-shaped
pattern between the country-level indices of corruption perception com-
monly used in empirical work, and various measures of political stability.6
The strength of this pattern, which is documented extensively in section 3,
can be veriﬁed along many dimensions. This U-shaped relationship shows
up consistently in our main speciﬁcation using the Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2006, henceforth KKM) corruption perception measure, even
after we control for a battery of additional determinants of corruption
deemed important in the literature. It is also robust to the use of the
Transparency International (TI) and International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) indices, two additional measures that are also widely used in em-
pirical work. We obtain these results using two diﬀerent measures of poli-
tical stability: (i) the historically observed average tenure of a country’s chief
executive and (ii) the average tenure of the party in power. (We also ﬁnd
supportive results using a more indirect measure of stability, the governing
coalition’s share of seats in the legislative.) Our ﬁndings hold both in a cross-
section of countries (where we average the relevant variables over time), as
well as when estimation is performed on the yearly data using dynamic panel
GMM techniques that help to allay concerns over endogeneity arising from
country-speciﬁc unobservables or reverse causality. Finally, we ﬁnd support
for a corollary concerning the relationship between corruption and the size
of government. Our model predicts that the latter variable is positively
correlated to stability, and hence also stands in a U-shaped pattern with
corruption; we do indeed ﬁnd some evidence for such a pattern in the data.
Our analysis yields meaningful policy implications regarding what in-
stitutional settings might be optimal for keeping corruption at bay. The non-
monotonic relationship between corruption and political stability identiﬁed
in our theory and supported in our empirical analysis suggests that a com-
bination of the possibility of re-election and the presence of term limits is
necessary: the former counteracts the incentives to embezzle posed by the
horizon eﬀect, whereas the latter keeps the demand eﬀect in check.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper falls within an extensive literature on the causes of corruption.7 It
builds on a well-established body of empirical work that has identiﬁed
6Interestingly, in one of the ﬁrst cross-country studies on corruption, Mauro (1995) reported a
positive correlation between the Business International corruption index for 1980–1983 and a
subjective index of political stability from the same source. However, his paper did not explore
the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship.
7For an overview of issues, see Bardhan (1997), Lambsdorﬀ (1999), and Svensson (2005).
various systematic determinants of corruption, including ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (Mauro, 1995), the presence of economic rents (Ades and
Di Tella, 1999), the level of democracy (Treisman, 2000), and electoral rules
(Persson et al., 2003). As we will show, our empirical results are robust to the
inclusion of these controls, which suggests that political stability also be-
longs on this list as a key proximate determinant of the incentives for cor-
ruption. While political stability has previously been linked to outcomes
such as aggregate growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Alesina et al., 1996),
this is one of the ﬁrst attempts (to the best of our knowledge) to model and
estimate a link to corruption.
Several earlier studies have alluded to a potential link between corruption
and stability. DeLong and Shleifer’s (1993) and Olson’s (1991, 2000)
discussions of the importance of decision-making horizons on the behavior
of incumbents, and to some extent the models of electoral account-
ability such as Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), include forces similar to
our horizon eﬀect.8 As for the demand eﬀect, similar considerations are
implicit in Rose-Ackerman’s (1999) discussion of the role of checks and
balances on the government in curbing corruption. Along similar lines,
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) analyze how corruption and instability
interact in inﬂuencing policy in a lobbying model. While their paper
contains ideas that resemble the horizon and demand eﬀects, it does
not deal directly with the impact of stability on corruption, taking
instead the incumbent’s propensity for corruption as an exogenous
parameter. In a diﬀerent but related context, Acemoglu (2005) also obtains
a U-shaped relationship between a ruler’s incentives to act in detriment
of public welfare and the inherent strength of the state, arising from a
similar interplay between his incentives to invest in the economy and his
ability to extract rents. While his mechanism operates via investment in
public goods, ours is based on the possibility of accumulating resources into
the future.
Most recently, and quite importantly, a growing body of work based on
microlevel measures of corruption has emerged that strongly aﬃrms the
empirical relevance of the key mechanisms underlying our theory. Using
evidence from Brazilian municipality audits, Ferraz and Finan (2007)
compare mayors who are in their ﬁrst term in oﬃce with those who are in
their second term, which by law has to be their last one. They show that
mayors in their mandatory last term tend to be more corrupt, a result that is
entirely consistent with the horizon eﬀect. More direct support comes from
Gamboa-Cavazos et al. (2006), who explicitly test an extension of our
8Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) prediction that weak decentralized governments would exhibit
more corruption also hints at a relationship with political stability. Their mechanism, however,
is the lack of coordination among diﬀerent public oﬃcials, whom private ﬁrms need to bribe to
obtain licenses that are complementary to each other. Our model, by contrast, focuses on public
oﬃcials who deal with corruption opportunities that are essentially unrelated.
model. They obtain measures of local corruption reported by private ﬁrms
in Mexico, and regress them on measures of the stability of state governors,
namely the number of years left in oﬃce and their legislative support.
Their ﬁnding of a U-shaped relationship between corruption and these
stability variables is an important piece of evidence that complements
the cross-country results we obtain, and further strengthens the case for our
framework.9 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and our key theoretical results. While we present the model in a more
general setting in which the incumbent can divert some resources toward
bolstering his stability, for pedagogical purposes, we ﬁrst build up the in-
tuition from a baseline case in which the incumbent treats his stability as an
exogenous parameter. We also discuss here two country case studies that
provide further illustration for the horizon and demand eﬀects that
we propose. We then turn in section 3 to the cross-country evidence on the
U-shaped relationship between corruption and political stability. Section 4
concludes.
2. THEORY: HOW INSTABILITY SHAPES THE
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION
2.1 The Model
2.1.1 Basic Setup. We consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy with an initial
pool of available resources, K0, the allocation of which is controlled by an
incumbent. There is some probability a that the incumbent and his policies
survive from one period to the next; a thus measures the incumbent’s sta-
bility. For simplicity, this incumbent derives personal utility only from di-
verting resources toward his corruption rents. At any given point in time, t,
resources can be diverted through either (i) ‘‘Embezzlement,’’ Et, which
entails direct stealing, or (ii) ‘‘Licensing,’’ Lt, which involves granting private
sector ﬁrms control over some of the resources in exchange for an upfront
bribe payment. In addition, the incumbent can choose to spend some
amount, Pt, out of the initial pool of resources to boost his own stability
(and thereby increase his probability of staying in power to enjoy future
rents): a is an increasing function of Pt, a(Pt).
10
The distinctive characteristic of the forms of corruption we gather under
the ‘‘licensing’’ label is that they entail an interaction between the incumbent
and private sector ﬁrms. Let p(Lt, a(Pt)) denote the ex ante expected value of
proﬁts reaped by the private ﬁrm from the license Lt. The key assumption
9Le et al. (2004) ﬁnd mixed evidence when investigating the cross-country relationship be-
tween corruption and stability, but their analysis uses measures of stability that focus more
narrowly on political violence and unrest.
10In the event that the incumbent is ousted, we assume he receives a zero payoﬀ in all sub-
sequent periods.
here is that p is an increasing function of stability. (In deriving the
equilibrium below, we will in fact impose the simplifying assumption that
the licenses become void when the incumbent is ousted, but we do not need
to go to this extreme.) This captures the idea that, to the extent that there is
an intertemporal dimension in the corrupt relationship, the presence of the
incumbent in power is valuable to the ﬁrm with whom he maintains that
relationship: an unstable incumbent will be less likely to be able to deliver on
his side of the deal, and hence will be less valuable to his prospective private-
sector partner. In particular, we specify that p(Lt, 0)¼ 0, so that ﬁrms have
no interest in bribing an unstable incumbent who has zero probability of
being in power in the next period.11 We assume that the incumbent has the
ability to extract a fraction s of expected proﬁts as an upfront bribe payment
for the license; s thus measures the incumbent’s bargaining power with
respect to the private sector.
Finally, in each period, the remaining untouched resources are trans-
formed into the pool of resources available in the next period, subject to
diminishing returns: Ktþ 1¼A(KtEtLtPt)g. This has the interpreta-
tion of being a growth equation with technological parameter A. In other
words, what is not embezzled, licensed, or spent in boosting stability is left
for the ‘‘rest of the economy’’ and accumulates over time. This sequence of
events is summarized in Figure 1.
START OF
PERIOD  t
Incumbent decides Et , Lt and Pt
Firm pays Incumbent for license
rights to Lt
Remaining resources are
accumulated into next period:
Kt+1 = A(Kt − Et − Lt)
START OF
PERIOD  t+1
Firm realizes pay-off from Lt
Incumbent decides on
Et+1, Lt+1, and Pt+1…Incumbent’s policycontinued with
probability (Pt)
 happens:
Figure 1. Sequence of events.
11This description of the ‘‘demand side’’ of the corrupt relationship can be reconciled with a
model of ‘‘political cycles’’ in which an incumbent might increase the number of licenses issued
just before an election, when his stability is at its lowest. In our setup, this increased supply
would be met by a low level of demand given the unstable position of the incumbent, and hence
fetch a low ‘‘price’’ per license. It is therefore possible for corruption rents from licensing to fall
during such periods of low stability.
The incumbent’s problem is one of maximizing his expected income.12 The
sequence problem for the incumbent can be described by
max
Et0;Lt0;Pt0
X1
t¼0
aðPtÞt½Et þ spðLt; aðPtÞÞ;
ð1Þ
where Ktþ1 ¼ AðKt  Et  Lt  PtÞg:
Our deﬁnition of corruption in each period, Gt, is the amount of illicit
income that the incumbent receives, normalized by the resources available at
the start of the period, namely
Gt ¼ Et þ spðLt; aðPtÞÞ
Kt
: ð2Þ
The normalization ensures that the measure of corruption is not subject to
scale eﬀects, so that larger countries are not deemed more corrupt simply
because there are more resources available.
2.1.2 Stability. We now elaborate on our formulation of incumbent stabil-
ity. The variable Pt captures the idea that the stability of the incumbent can be
aﬀected by the resource allocation decisions he makes. Concretely, one can
think of Pt as an amalgam of expenditures that can improve his stability in
diﬀerent ways, including: public goods spending that is valued by the masses,
such as on education, healthcare or infrastructure; expenditures that can be
used to restrain public opposition, such as military or police spending; and
patronage strategically dispensed to cultivate political support from key voters
or political players. While we will refer to Pt as ‘‘public goods provision,’’
the important thing for our purposes is that this expenditure boosts the in-
cumbent’s stability but also diverts resources away from his own pocket.
Following this discussion, we specify stability to be a function of the incum-
bent’s choice of Pt, denoted by g(Pt), where g(  ) is increasing and concave,
with g(0)¼ 0. This function enables us to describe how eﬀective public goods
provision is in bolstering the incumbent’s position.
In practice, however, an incumbent’s stability also depends on some factors
that he cannot easily aﬀect. We incorporate this feature by assuming that
overall stability also depends on the intrinsic stability of the polity, denoted by
zA[0, 1]. We interpret z as an exogenous, ‘‘systemic’’ level of stability
capturing underlying features such as the ethnic composition of the popula-
tion or cultural norms, which are largely beyond the incumbent’s control.
Note that these deep-seated features can in turn be mapped into a desired level
of public goods provision, Pz, deﬁned by g(Pz)¼ z. For instance, following
12We implicitly assume that the incumbent can smooth his consumption over time, for ex-
ample, by depositing the income in an oﬀshore account. We treat such funds as unrecoverable
by the state should the incumbent be ousted. For simplicity, there is no time discounting in
addition to what is implicitly introduced by the stability parameter.
Alesina et al. (1999), a more fractionalized polity with a lower z would in
equilibrium have a lower desired level of public goods provision, because each
individual attaches a smaller value to public goods consumption by other
people who do not belong to his/her ethnic group.
In sum, we specify stability (with a slight abuse of notation) to be
a¼ a(z, g(P)), where the latter expression allows us to distinguish between
the components of stability that are under the incumbent’s control, and
those that are beyond it.
2.2 Benchmark Case: Exogenous Stability
It is useful to start by presenting a benchmark special case of the model in
which stability is entirely beyond the incumbent’s control, namely where g(P)
and hence a are constants. This special case conveys the basic intuition in its
sharpest form; we will then move on to show how the intuition generalizes,
and how new testable predictions can be obtained in the more general model.
2.2.1 Characterizing the Equilibrium. For ease of exposition, we focus on a
simple case for the private sector’s expected proﬁt function: p(Lt, a)¼ aAFLt,
where AF is the private sector technology parameter. This corresponds to a
situation where the license is valid for one period only, period tþ 1, and
production is undertaken with an AK technology, subject to the possibility
that the license will be voided in the event of a discontinuation of the in-
cumbent’s policies.13 The problem in (1) can now be reformulated as a
Bellman equation with value function V(  ):
VðK0Þ ¼ max
E00;L00
fE0 þ saAFL0 þ aVðK1Þg;
where K1 ¼ AðK0  E0  L0Þg:
ð3Þ
It is easy to show, from the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to E0 and L0,
that one of these quantities must be zero, except in a knife-edge scenario.
(This is a consequence of the linear functional forms in this baseline model.
In an appendix available on request, we have also established our results
with an objective function that is jointly concave in both embezzlement and
licensing revenues, and which therefore allows both forms of corruption to
coexist in equilibrium.) Which of these two cases will prevail depends on the
parameters of the model. If saAFo 1, then the marginal gain from a small
increment in E0 exceeds that from a similar increment in L0. In this case, the
incumbent does not allocate any resources to licensing, and corruption takes
only the form of embezzlement. Conversely, if saAF4 1, then the incumbent
reaps private revenues through licensing only. The analysis is most
13The basic results in the propositions below hold for a fairly general class of functional forms
for p(Lt, a) satisfying pL4 0, pa4 0, and pLa4 0.
interesting when the cutoﬀ value of a separating the two cases, a  1=sAF ,
lies in the interval [0, 1], which happens when sAF4 1. Intuitively, this con-
dition means that the incumbent’s ability to extract surplus and the private
technology parameter are high enough, so that licensing is attractive over part
of the relevant [0, 1] range for a. We now characterize the two cases:
Case 1. saAFo 1, i.e. a<1=sAF .
In this case, Lt¼ 0 for all t  0. Using the FOCs, the Envelope Theorem,
and (2), one can solve for the level of embezzlement-related corruption:
G0 ¼ 1 ðAagÞ
1
1g
K0
Gt ¼ 1 ag; 8t  1
9>=
>;: ð4Þ
Observe that corruption depends on the initial endowment of resources, K0,
only in the very ﬁrst period (t¼ 0); from t¼ 1 onwards, the model is in a ‘‘steady
state’’ in which corruption remains constant, given the parameter values.14
Case 2. saAF4 1, i.e. a>1=sAF .
Here, the marginal gain from a small increment in L0 exceeds that from a
similar increase in E0. The incumbent now does not allocate any resources to
embezzlement, and corruption takes only the form of licensing revenues.
From the FOCs and (2), this yields the following expression for corruption:
G0 ¼ sAFa 1
Aagð Þ 11g
K0
" #
Gt ¼ sAFað1 agÞ; 8t  1
9>=
>>;: ð5Þ
2.2.2 Corruption and Stability. We now analyze the comparative statics for
corruption with respect to stability, focusing on the steady state (t  1).15
14In this basic framework, we thus have a ‘‘cleaning-up’’ property, in which any amount of the
period-0 endowment in excess of the steady-state value of Kt is consumed immediately and the
economy reaches a steady state with a constant level of corruption in one period. This ‘‘cleaning-
up’’ property holds whenever the incumbent’s per-period utility is linear in Et.
15The diﬀerence between comparative statics in steady state and in transition has to do with
whether the pool of resources at the start of the period is exogenous, or whether this is taken to
be the steady-state value of Kt. More precisely, a change in a will shift the economy toward a
new steady state; G0 thus captures the short-run behavior of corruption in transition, while Gt
(t  1) describes the behavior of corruption in the new steady state. From the expressions in (4)
and (5), it is clear that the response of corruption to a is qualitatively similar in both transition
and steady state, so long as K0 is suﬃciently large. Note also that a quick substitution of a ¼
1=sAF into the expressions for G0 and Gt from the two cases shows that corruption is indeed a
continuous function of stability for all periods.
Consider ﬁrst Case 1. It is straightforward to see from (4) that Gt is de-
creasing in a; hence, corruption is decreasing in stability for ao a. Here,
the one force at play is the horizon eﬀect operating through the incentives to
embezzle: more unstable incumbents have a greater incentive to steal re-
sources now instead of leaving them to future periods when they are likely to
be out of oﬃce. While ﬁrms do have some incentive to oﬀer bribes to the
incumbent so long as a4 0, the expected returns from these licenses are
small, so that any bribes oﬀered are insuﬃcient to persuade the incumbent to
substitute away from embezzlement.
Turning to Case 2, notice from (5) that a now enters the expression for Gt
in two places, which generate opposite eﬀects on the level of corruption. The
inﬂuence of a on corruption thus involves a rich interplay between a horizon
eﬀect – because the optimal amount of licensing also takes into considera-
tion the tradeoﬀ with respect to leaving resources to the future – and a new
demand eﬀect, whereby ﬁrms are willing to pay higher bribes to more stable
incumbents. It is the latter eﬀect that tends to make corruption increase in
stability. It turns out that when g is suﬃciently small ðg  1
2
Þ, diminishing
returns set in fast enough in the accumulation equation for Kt, so that it is
relatively unattractive for the incumbent to set resources aside for the future.
In this situation, the demand eﬀect unambiguously prevails over the horizon
eﬀect. If, on the other hand, we have g> 1
2
, the demand eﬀect still prevails
over some range of stability, so long as licensing represents a suﬃciently
large source of corruption rents for the incumbent (sAF is large enough).
Now, however, the horizon eﬀect may kick in again at the highest levels of
stability, as very stable incumbents may ﬁnd it worthwhile to allow some
resources to accumulate into the future instead of disbursing more licenses.16
In short, the general lesson is that corruption will be increasing over some
range of stability, while possibly but not necessarily becoming decreasing in
stability at the highest levels of a.
Bringing these two cases together, we have our central proposition on how
stability aﬀects corruption in steady state:
Proposition 1. Suppose that K0>A
1
1gðagÞ
g
1g (so that K0 exceeds the steady-
state level of resources in the economy), and sAF4maxf2g, 1g. Then
(i) If g  1
2
, steady-state corruption is decreasing in stability a for a<
a  1=sAF , and increasing in a for a4 a.
(ii) If g> 1
2
, steady-state corruption is decreasing in stability a for aoa,
increasing in a for a<a<a  1=2g, and decreasing in a for a4a.
16Speciﬁcally, we have from (5) that dGt=da ¼ sAF ð1 2agÞ, for all t  1. A necessary and
suﬃcient condition for dGt=da  0 for all a[ ½a; 1 is g  12. If g> 12, then corruption will increase
for a<1=2g  a, while dGt=da<0 for values of a that exceed a. Note that a necessary and
suﬃcient condition to ensure that 0o ao 1 and a4 a is sAF4maxf2g, 1g, so that rev-
enues from licensing will be suﬃciently large to allow the demand eﬀect to gain salience over
some range of a.
In words, our model generates a steady state where at ﬁrst corruption de-
creases with stability, and eventually starts to increase (with a possibility that
it starts to decrease once again for very high levels of stability). Put diﬀer-
ently, we end up with a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and
stability, which will look like a U-shape so long as diminishing returns play
an important role in the accumulation of resources: very stable and very
unstable incumbents will tend to be more corrupt than those at an inter-
mediate range of stability.
The logic that drives this result is very intuitive, and it is the key message
of our paper. In the range of low stability, ﬁrms are unwilling to pay high
bribes to unstable incumbents, so that embezzlement becomes the
main means for self-enrichment. As a result, the horizon eﬀect dominates:
corruption falls as the incumbent’s stability improves and the incentive to
embezzle decreases. Beyond a certain level of stability, however, licensing
becomes the more proﬁtable option, as suﬃciently stable incumbents
are able to extract larger bribes from ﬁrms. Therefore, the demand eﬀect
kicks in over the range of high stability so long as sAF is suﬃciently large:
corruption increases as stability improves, because ﬁrms are willing to oﬀer
ever larger amounts of bribes. This demand eﬀect is sure to dominate over
at least some range of high stability, although the horizon eﬀect, which
naturally aﬀects both types of corruption, may under some circumstances
regain the upper hand at the very highest levels of stability. The overall
U-shaped pattern, by which we mean that corruption decreases in stability
for lower levels of a, and then eventually starts to increase, is the key testable
prediction of our model.
Furthermore, the model yields several interesting predictions on the eﬀects
of parameter shifts:
Proposition 2. Based on the expressions for steady-state corruption in (4)
and (5):
(i) Corruption is weakly increasing in the incumbent’s bargaining power
vis-a`-vis the private sector, s, and the productivity of the private
sector technology, AF.
(ii) Over the range of a where the demand eﬀect dominates, in response to
a given rise in s or AF, the increase in corruption is larger when the
incumbent is more stable (i.e. a is higher).
Proof. By inspection of (4) and (5), it is clear that s and AF increase cor-
ruption from licensing while not aﬀecting corruption from embezzlement.
This establishes part (i) of the proposition. For part (ii), it is easy to check
from (5) that the cross-derivative with respect to sAF and a is positive,
whenever Gt is increasing in a. ’
This proposition lends itself to a natural interpretation. Part (i) follows from
the fact that corruption revenues from the private sector rise
when either the bargaining position of the government is strengthened or
when the private sector technology improves. As for part (ii), notice that
s and AF aﬀect the corruption revenues from licensing, but not from
embezzlement. As a result, these parameters gain salience in the range of
a where licensing dominates, resulting in a larger increase in corruption
when the incumbent is more stable. Note that our formulation takes s to
be independent of a, but one could also expect more stable incumbents to
command more bargaining power over the private sector. Incorporating
this simple extension would only reinforce the upward-sloping relationship
between corruption and stability for the high levels of a where the demand
eﬀect prevails.
2.3 General Case: Endogenous Stability
Armed with the intuition from this benchmark case, we now turn to consider
the general formulation in which the incumbent can divert resources to
bolster his stability: a¼ a(z, g(P)). For concreteness, we think of Pz, the
desired level of public goods provision deﬁned in section 2.1.2, as estab-
lishing a ‘‘ceiling’’ on stability, whereby any shortfall of public goods pro-
vision with respect to this level will weaken the incumbent’s position. We
thus model stability, a, as a ¼ minðz; gðPÞÞ: Note that this boils down to an
assumption that public goods provision and intrinsic stability are (perfect)
complements from the standpoint of how they contribute to a. In other
words, polities that are intrinsically more stable allow an incumbent to better
translate spending on public goods into enhanced stability. Two things are
worth stressing in that regard, the ﬁrst one being that we do not need perfect
complementarity: our results hold as long as there is suﬃcient com-
plementarity between the endogenous and exogenous components of stabil-
ity, so that z and g(P) covary together. Second, while this complementarity is
ultimately an empirical question (to which our results will speak indirectly),
we believe there is a priori good reason to consider it plausible. To the extent
that the systemic component z is tied to deeper features of the polity such as
ethnic fractionalization, if z and P were instead substitutes, one would then
expect to see higher levels of endogenous public goods provision in more
ethnically fractionalized countries, to try to compensate for the poor sys-
temic stability in these polities. This would be at odds, however, with the
empirical evidence that fractionalization tends to be associated with less
public goods spending (Alesina et al., 1999). Moreover, one might then
expect to observe no speciﬁc relationship between ethnic fractionalization
and overall political stability, a(z, g(P)), whereas it has instead been estab-
lished that the correlation between these two variables is indeed clearly ne-
gative (Alesina et al., 2003).
The incumbent’s problem from the benchmark case, (3), can now be
adapted as follows:
VðK0Þ ¼ max
E00;L00;P00
fE0 þ sminðz; gðP0ÞÞAFLt
þminðz; gðP0ÞÞVðK1Þg;
where K1 ¼ AðK0  E0  L0  P0Þg:
ð6Þ
We can now state a result that mirrors Proposition 1 on the non-monotonic
relationship between corruption and stability:
Proposition 3. Suppose that g(P) belongs to the class of increasing concave
functions g(P)¼ (cP)r, where c4 0 and 0o ro 1. Moreover, suppose that
A and K0 are suﬃciently large, and that sAF4 2. Then there exists
~a; ~a [ ½0; 1, with ~a<~a, such that:
(i) If g  1
2
, steady-state corruption is decreasing in stability a for a<~a,
and increasing in a for a>~a.
(ii) If g> 1
2
, steady-state corruption is decreasing in stability a for a<~a,
increasing in a for ~a<a<~a, and decreasing in a for a>~a.
The proof of this proposition is similar to, albeit more extended than, that
for the baseline model (details available in a separate appendix on request).
Intuitively, when there is suﬃcient complementarity between z and g(P),
both of them covary together. At low levels of z, the incumbent thus has little
incentive to set aside resources for public goods, because this has little in-
cremental eﬀect on his actual stability, so that corruption will be high when a
is low. On the other hand, at high levels of z, there is some incentive to raise
P; nevertheless, because the mechanism for improving stability [the function
g(  )] exhibits diminishing returns, this rise in P is relatively moderate and
does not detract from the fact that a signiﬁcant quantum of resources is still
being allocated to embezzlement or licensing. In short, corruption remains
high when a is high. It is moreover straightforward to see that the com-
parative statics from Proposition 2 continue to hold in this extension.
On a separate note, we are now in a position to derive a testable im-
plication concerning how corruption and stability covary with the level of
public goods provision. In our model, we interpret public goods provision as
equivalent to the size of government, given that P is the only form of gov-
ernment expenditure. This yields the following result:
Proposition 4 (Size of Government). Given the same parameter conditions
as in Proposition 3, if corruption is U-shaped with respect to stability,
then corruption also stands in a U-shaped relationship with respect to the
size of government.
Proof. Public goods provision is weakly increasing in the level of intrinsic
stability, given the complementarity between z and P. Thus, the relationship
between corruption and the size of government inherits the same shape as
that between corruption and (intrinsic) stability. ’
In words, governments which are either very small or very large are asso-
ciated with more corruption, but those of an intermediate size witness lower
levels of corruption. In our model, the reason for this pattern is that gov-
ernments are very small or very large because they are, respectively, in-
trinsically highly unstable or highly stable, and both of these extremes are
associated with high levels of corruption.
2.4 Case Studies
The logic of our model can be vividly illustrated through a couple of country
case studies. These examples highlight how the horizon and demand eﬀects
can be useful for understanding an individual country’s experiences with
corruption and political stability over time.
2.4.1 Brazil. Brazil in the 1990s is a clear example of a country that started
with very low levels of stability and high levels of corruption, but which later
transitioned into a less corrupt regime as stability improved. Its experience is
therefore consistent with the ‘‘downward-sloping arm’’ of the U-shape be-
tween corruption and stability, driven by the horizon eﬀect.17
In the 1980s, Brazil underwent a transition from military rule to
democracy. Soon afterwards, however, in 1992, the ﬁrst directly elected
president in 29 years, Fernando Collor de Mello, became the ﬁrst Brazilian
president to be impeached, as evidence of widespread and rampant corrup-
tion mounted against him and his closest associates. According to Geddes
and Ribeiro Netto (1999, p. 22), it is apparent that ‘‘corruption did increase
in Brazil during the 1980s and early 1990s . . . The amounts of money
described and numbers of people implicated in corruption schemes investi-
gated. . . are substantially greater than those described in earlier inquiries.’’
Similarly, Skidmore (1999, p. 8) describes the levels of corruption during the
Collor administration as ‘‘unprecedented.’’
One feature consistently stressed by many scholars that have studied this
period was the high level of instability. The electoral rules created during the
democratic transition led to a proliferation of political parties, so that it
became extremely hard for the chief executive to build a stable coalition. No
fewer than 17 parties were represented in Congress by 1990, with the three
largest delegations not adding up to a simple majority. Collor’s party,
despite his winning the presidential election, held only 6.3% of the legislative
17What follows draws upon Geddes and Ribeiro Neto (1999), Skidmore (1999), and Souza
(1999).
seats as the new administration took oﬃce. That the president was im-
peached during his third year in oﬃce is itself illustrative of how unstable his
administration was. The president’s ability to push through his policies was
severely limited, and Geddes and Ribeiro Neto (1999) argue explicitly that
this institutional setup was central in explaining the increase in corruption.
Observers have also linked the short time horizons of public oﬃcials
during this period to the high levels of corruption, which is precisely what we
have termed the horizon eﬀect. For instance, Geddes and Ribeiro Neto
(1999) stress that, in light of their unimpressive professional status, ‘‘many of
the appointed members of Collor’s original team could expect only a short
term in oﬃce . . . [and] the temptation to ‘take the money and run’ increased’’
(p. 42). In short, there is clear evidence of a link between an environment of
high instability and high levels of corruption, with a strong embezzlement
component.
Following Collor’s impeachment, the corruption situation is widely seen
to have improved as stability increased over time under the Itamar Franco
(1992–1994) and the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administrations (1995–
2002), as is consistent with our theory. The coalition that elected Cardoso
held nearly one-half of all congressional seats, and was reputed to be ‘‘fairly
stable,’’ while Cardoso himself came ‘‘from a party of respectable size and
reasonable coherence’’ (p. 45). Add to this the approval in 1997 of a
constitutional amendment allowing for re-election to executive oﬃces, and
what emerged was a context of signiﬁcantly improved stability. Conse-
quently, Geddes and Ribeiro Neto (1999) argue that the ‘‘take the money
and run’’ temptation ‘‘lessened in post-Collor administrations. Franco’s
appointees . . . had every reason to expect their careers in public life to
continue afterward [and] Cardoso’s appointments to high-ranking positions
include many of the best economists in the country, as well as able
professionals in other ﬁelds . . . [S]uch appointees have a longer time
horizon’’ (p. 42). At the same time, various institutional measures to ﬁght
corruption were also implemented. These included a law to regulate
government procurement (Lei de Licitac¸o˜es), which is acknowledged to
have been an eﬀective tool in reducing corruption (Gonc¸alves da Silva,
2000), as well as a law requiring public oﬃceholders to disclose personal
assets and income sources, both introduced in 1993. Such measures
culminated with the establishment in 2001 of the Controladoria-Geral da
Unia˜o, a widely praised anticorruption agency at the ministerial level
(Ferraz and Finan, 2007). We thus conclude that the case of Brazil in the
1990s provides support for the mechanisms behind the ‘‘downward-sloping
arm’’ of the U-shape in our theory.
2.4.2 Mexico. Mexico illustrates the converse phenomenon: a country that
started with very high levels of stability and corruption, which later became
less corrupt as the absolute stability of the regime weakened.
Starting in 1929, the PRI was in power in Mexico for more than seven
decades without interruption. This was undoubtedly a very stable regime,
under control of the president whose powers were ‘‘almost those of a
monarch’’ (Preston and Dillon, 2004, p. 52). The president himself selected
party candidates for congressional posts, and turned the PRI-dominated
legislature into a rubber-stamping machine for his decisions. Although re-
election was prohibited, long political horizons were guaranteed by the fact
that the president got to pick the party’s candidate for his succession – which
amounted to anointing his successor, in a process nicknamed dedazo (‘‘ﬁnger
tap’’) – and the ‘‘unwritten rule that former presidents and their families
would not be criticized, let alone prosecuted’’ (p. 57).
Our theory would therefore predict high levels of corruption as a result, as
is indeed the conclusion of just about every observer. According to Preston
and Dillon (2004), ‘‘among the system’s basic codes of conduct, corruption
seemed to be one of the most fundamental’’ (p. 57). Moreover, the demand
eﬀect would predict that licensing and bribery would have been an important
part of the way corruption manifested itself. This is conﬁrmed by existing
accounts: ‘‘With business heavily dependent on government contracts, the
lines between the public and private sectors were often blurred. An executive
receiving a substantial government contract would include in his cost
calculations, as a matter of course, a commission for the oﬃcial who
approved the deal . . . [G]overnment oﬃcials often became silent partners
in the deals they authorized’’ (p. 184). Indeed, this link between stability and
corruption in the PRI regime has not gone unnoticed: ‘‘Authoritarian rule
tended to breed corruption. Because PRI oﬃcials were ﬁnally accountable to
no one but the President, it behooved special interests to ply them with
bribes, and with the President drawn from the same party over the decades,
incoming administrations had little incentive to clean house or punish abuses
by their predecessors’’ (p. 326).
Starting in the 1990s, however, stability started to decrease toward a more
moderate level consistent with a better-functioning democracy, and this
transition appears to have been accompanied by some reduction in corrup-
tion, in line with our model. Ernesto Zedillo became president in 1994 after
the dedazo system was disrupted by the assassination of Carlos Salinas’s
anointed successor. Zedillo implemented reforms in the electoral process
that reduced the party’s control over election results, and in 1997, for the
ﬁrst time in modern Mexican history, the PRI was left with less than 50% of
the seats in the lower house of Congress. As a culmination of this process,
the opposition won the 2000 presidential elections behind Vicente Fox. Fox’s
party, however, controlled less than 40% of the seats in both houses. Under
these circumstances, ‘‘democratic checks were restricting his powers to a
degree faced by no previous Mexican president . . . [T]he Congress had
become far more assertive, defeating a considerable percentage of the bills he
proposed and rewriting everything’’ (p. 514).
While there is widespread disappointment that Fox did not live up fully to
high public expectations on corruption eradication, it has nevertheless been
argued that the administration ‘‘actually made important investments in the
future of clean government . . . bringing the anticorruption agency up to
global standards’’ (Rosenberg, 2003). An acclaimed ‘‘freedom of informa-
tion act’’ was also implemented. This suggests that corruption has decreased
somewhat. In short, the Mexican experience of falling corruption as stability
improved is consistent with the ‘‘upward-sloping arm’’ of our U-shape.
3. EMPIRICS: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE
Having developed a set of theoretical predictions on the relationship be-
tween corruption and stability, we turn now to the cross-country empirical
evidence. We ﬁrst discuss the measures we employ, particularly the variables
that we use to capture stability (section 3.1). Using these data, we demon-
strate a systematic U-shaped pattern linking corruption and stability, one
that is remarkably robust to the use of diﬀerent corruption indices as well
as measures of incumbent stability (section 3.2). We also ﬁnd suggestive
evidence of a U-shaped relationship between corruption and the size of
government, consistent with a key corollary of the model (section 3.3).
3.1 Measures of Corruption Perception and Political Stability
3.1.1 Corruption Perception. Corruption is a particularly diﬃcult phe-
nomenon to quantify, much less compare across countries, given the illicit
nature of such transactions. Following much of the cross-country empirical
literature, we focus therefore on indices of corruption perception that are
based on institutional assessments or surveys.18 Our main dependent vari-
able is the ‘‘Control of Corruption’’ measure from KKM (2006), a com-
prehensive eﬀort that pools together country governance indices from
disparate sources. In all, 31 indices from 25 diﬀerent organizations (such as
Gallup International, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum)
were collected and aggregated using an unobserved components methodol-
ogy, yielding an extensive dataset with more than 150 countries. KKM
reports scores between 1996 and 2002 at two-year intervals, and thereafter
for 2002–2005 on an annual basis.
We also use two other leading corruption indicators to corroborate our
results, namely the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the ICRG. The
CPI is released annually by TI, a global anticorruption civic organization.
Like KKM, it also combines institutional assessments of corruption, but
uses a non-parametric aggregation procedure instead. The CPI is deliber-
ately more selective in its choice of indices included in the aggregation;
18See Kaufmann et al. (2007) for a detailed response to criticisms against such corruption
measures.
the 2005 CPI, for example, was based on 16 indices from 10 diﬀerent
organizations (see Lambsdorﬀ, 2005, for details). As a result, the CPI is
available for slightly fewer countries, exceeding 100 countries only after
2001. The aggregation approach adopted by KKM and the CPI is intended
to reduce the eﬀects of biases that might be inherent in any single source
index. To further screen out potentially less reliable data points, we dropped
all observations that were based on fewer than three source indices in our
analysis. (None of our conclusions change if we instead use all the data
points; results available on request.)
Our third and ﬁnal corruption index – the ICRG – is based on a distinct
methodology independently developed by Political Risk Services, a private
country risk assessment agency. The ICRG country ratings cover a broad set
of political and economic categories, including one component on corrup-
tion within the political system. These ratings are available on a commercial
basis – ICRG clients are understood to include ﬁrms seeking business
opportunities overseas – and so the ICRG corruption score focuses on
aspects of corruption that are pertinent to the conduct of private business.
The ICRG is released on a monthly basis for up to 140 countries. We
averaged the monthly corruption scores to obtain an annual measure, when
all 12 months of corruption ratings were available.19
For comparability, we linearly rescaled all three measures so that they
range between  2.5 and 2.5, with higher values corresponding to more
perceived corruption. Overall, the three indices are very highly correlated.
The KKM and CPI country mean scores (averaged over 2002–2005) sport a
high correlation coeﬃcient of 0.98. The correlation with the 2002–2005
ICRG country average is only slightly lower (0.88 with KKM and 0.90 with
the CPI), which suggests that the ICRG may be picking up on slightly
diﬀerent dimensions of country corruption.20 These indices provide a
natural starting point for our empirical tests of the U-shaped relationship
between total corruption and political stability, because they in principle
provide assessments of overall corruption, without excluding speciﬁc corrupt
activities – such as embezzlement or licensing – that are subject to the
diﬀerent eﬀects highlighted in our theory. The CPI, for example, states that
its component sources are selected from surveys that do not emphasize one
form of corruption over another (Lambsdorﬀ, 2005, p. 5).21 While the ICRG
19It should be noted that the ICRG is a component index used in KKM, but not in the CPI.
20The high level of agreement between alternative corruption perception indices is also noted
by Svensson (2005).
21‘‘It has been suggested in numerous publications that distinctions should be made between
these forms of corruption, for example between nepotism and corruption in the form of
monetary transfers. Yet, none of the data included in the CPI emphasize one form of corruption
at the expense of other forms. The sources can be said to aim at measuring the same broad
phenomenon. As also emphasized in the background documents of previous years, the sources
do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption, nor between petty and grand
corruption’’ (Lambsdorﬀ, 2005).
focuses more on political corruption such as close ties between politicians
and ﬁrms, it does not exclude more direct and petty forms of extortion and
bribery that hinder the regular conduct of business activities.
3.1.2 Political Stability. Turning to our key explanatory variable, we
worked with two distinct sets of stability measures, the ﬁrst of which focuses
on the historically observed average length of incumbent tenures. We view
this as a simple means to capture how long a political incumbent can expect
to hold onto the reins of executive power given recent conditions in the
country, with a longer average tenure corresponding to a higher level of
incumbent stability. To construct this measure, we used an encyclopedia –
WorldStatesmen.org – that compiles chronologies of heads of state and
heads of government for countries and territories around the world,
including their party aﬃliation and dates of political transitions. This
encyclopedia is extremely comprehensive and regularly updated (political
changes in real time are typically updated within a week), while also fully
disclosing the list of sources and contributors consulted in assembling the
chronologies. As a cross-check, we compared the accounts in World-
Statesmen.org for consistency with Beck et al.’s (2001) Database of Political
Institutions (DPI), to corroborate the years in which political transitions
occurred (see Appendix A for details).22
We construct these average tenure measures using a 20-year window.
Speciﬁcally, for each year in our sample, we calculate average tenure as 20
divided by one plus the number of observed government changes that took
place in the preceding 20 years. Two separate variables were constructed
counting, respectively, changes in individual chief executives, and changes in
the party holding the seat of chief executive. While political titles diﬀer
across countries, we took the chief executive to be the de facto head of
government as coded in the DPI.23 In particular, for most communist states,
we follow the DPI in coding the secretary-general of the communist party as
the chief executive.24 For our purposes, we treat military rulers and
independents as separate and distinct parties, while also counting all interim
22We did not use the DPI as our main source, because it documents the identity and party of
the chief executive as of January 1 of each year, and does not record instances of multiple
changes within a calendar year.
23Panama oﬀers an example of a country where the nominal head of government did not
command real executive power for a long period. General Manuel Noriega is coded by the DPI
as the chief executive between 1982 and 1989, even though he never assumed the formal post of
President. There are also a handful of countries in which the post to which chief executive
powers are attached switched midway during the sample period. For example, Bangladesh
switched from a presidential to a parliamentary system in 1992. Our codings follow whoever the
chief executive is, as designated in the DPI, regardless of the exact title of the relevant post.
24An exception here is China under Deng Xiaoping, who never held the position of secretary-
general, although he was the unquestioned de facto leader from 1978 until his death in 1997. Our
codings designate Deng as the chief executive during these years, although this is incon-
sequential for the average party tenure measure.
and acting heads of government. We count situations in which an incumbent
switches party aﬃliation while in power as a change in party. We adopt these
mechanical rules to avoid making judgment calls about how substantial
these changes to the political scene were; implicitly, this rule views the need
for an acting head or for a change in party allegiance to be a signal of some
potential instability in the political status quo.
We report results using both ‘‘Executive Tenure’’ and ‘‘Party Tenure,’’
because good arguments can be made in favor of both as measures of the
relevant decision-making horizon of political oﬃceholders. On the one hand,
‘‘Executive Tenure’’ likely understates political stability in countries, such as
Japan and Mexico, which experienced regular turnover of heads of govern-
ment, even though the ruling party (the LDP and PRI, respectively)
remained entrenched for several decades. On the other hand, changes in
individual chief executives are often accompanied by turnover across the
government hierarchy and patronage networks, in which case the decision-
making horizon for corrupt agents would be better captured by ‘‘Executive
Tenure’’ rather than by ‘‘Party Tenure.’’ It is reassuring therefore that our
empirical results work well with either tenure measure.
When constructing these variables, we adopt a 20-year window to allow a
suﬃciently long period over which to assess the average duration of an
incumbent’s stay in power. With the ﬁrst year in the KKM sample being
1996, the earliest window we use is 1976–1995, and so we can calculate
average tenure using a full 20-year window for countries that became
independent before 1976. This covers most of the countries that gained
independence in the post-World War II wave of decolonization. For
countries that gained independence more recently, we can still calculate
average tenure using only the years since independence, but this comes at the
cost of introducing more noise as we shorten the window over which the
average is taken. For this reason, we typically exclude these young countries
(most of which are from the former Soviet Union) from our sample. In our
preferred speciﬁcations, we also drop Switzerland because average tenure is
arguably a poor proxy for political stability in this instance: the Swiss have
practised a unique seven-member presidency for more than 150 years, in
which the post of chief executive rotates yearly among the seven members,
and thus the average tenure of individual chief executives severely under-
states how stable the polity is.25
Our second measure of political stability is more straightforward to
describe. We focus here on the strength of the incumbent’s position in the
country’s legislative body. To this eﬀect, we use the ‘‘Majority’’ variable
from the DPI, which is equal to the share of seats in the legislature occupied
by the governing party or coalition. A higher fraction of seats controlled by
25In practice, our results from the cross-section regressions do not change much when we
include Switzerland; results available on request.
the ruling party would imply a lower likelihood of the opposition impeding
policy decisions (including decisions, e.g. to award licenses and contracts to
favored private ﬁrms) or attempting to oust the incumbent, so that higher
values of ‘‘Majority’’ would correspond to more incumbent stability.
3.2 The U-Shape between Corruption and Stability
We proceed to our results on the robust U-shaped relationship between
corruption and incumbent stability. We consider evidence from two types of
empirical speciﬁcations: (i) cross-section regressions, where the dependent
variable is the average corruption score from 2002 to 2005 for each country;
and (ii) regressions where the dependent variable is the corruption score from
individual years pooled across all years from 1996 to 2005. Since all three
corruption indices display a high level of persistence over time, it is natural to
attempt ﬁrst to identify any relationship between corruption and stability at
the cross-country level through the cross-section regressions.26 We then turn
to the pooled regressions to make full use of all the years of information at our
disposal. Here, we also use dynamic panel techniques that allow us to account
for country ﬁxed eﬀects, while instrumenting for political stability to address
potential problems arising from reverse causality.
3.2.1 Average Incumbent Tenure. We present ﬁrst the results from the
cross-section regressions using average incumbent tenure as our measure of
political stability. In order to pick up the non-monotonic relationship be-
tween corruption and stability, we include both stability and its square on
the right-hand side of our regressions. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following
via ordinary least squares:
Corrupi ¼ b0 þ ba  Stabi þ ba2  ðStabiÞ2 þ bXXi þ ei; ð7Þ
where i indexes country. The dependent variable, Corrupi, is the mean cor-
ruption score from 2002 to 2005, where the sample includes only those
countries for which all four years of corruption scores were available. We use
‘‘Executive Tenure’’ and ‘‘Party Tenure’’ as measures of political stability,
Stabi, in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Xi denotes additional determinants of
corruption included as control variables, with bX being the corresponding
coeﬃcient vector. Because our focus here is on the long-run determinants of
corruption, the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of (7) are
averages over the same lagged window used in the construction of the
average tenure variable unless otherwise stated (this is 1982–2001 in most
columns). We report Huber–White robust standard errors for the coeﬃcient
estimates, to account for possible heteroskedasticity in the residuals, ei.
26The correlation between the KKM scores (and likewise for the CPI) in any two years be-
tween 1996 and 2005 is in excess of 0.9. The ICRG is slightly less persistent over time, with a
pairwise correlation between any two years exceeding 0.68.
(Table A1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in this cross-
section analysis, while Appendix A documents how these variables were
collected or constructed.)
Table 1a reveals a clear, robust U-shaped relationship between the KKM
corruption index and political stability as measured by the average tenure of
the chief executive. Throughout columns (1)–(6), we obtain a negative
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on log ‘‘Executive Tenure,’’ and a positive signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on log ‘‘Executive Tenure’’ squared. Corruption is thus decreas-
ing in stability for low ranges of average tenure, while increasing in stability
at high ranges. The estimates imply a U-shape with a fairly stable turning
point, with corruption reaching its minimum at around seven to nine years
of executive tenure in our full speciﬁcations in columns (5) and (6). The last
row conﬁrms that this turning point lies in the interior of the relevant
window of 0–20 years with a high probability (typically in excess of 95%), as
calculated from 1,000 Monte Carlo draws from the asymptotic multivariate
normal distribution of the coeﬃcient estimates.
Column (1) presents a bare-bones regression, in which only log ‘‘Executive
Tenure’’ and its square are included on the right-hand side. We already ﬁnd
evidence in this minimal speciﬁcation of a U-shaped relationship between
corruption and stability, although the R2 is understandably low (¼ 0.03) given
the small number of covariates.27 Column (2) introduces log real GDP per
capita [from the World Development Indicators (WDI)] and its square, as well
as region dummies, to help to control for any components in the corruption
index that might be systematically correlated with a country’s overall economic
performance. Not surprisingly, the income coeﬃcient comes out negative and
highly signiﬁcant; the squared term suggests some concavity in the relationship
between corruption and income, but the overall pattern is consistent with the
stylized fact that richer countries are perceived as being less corrupt.
This U-shaped pattern continues to be remarkably robust to the intro-
duction of many other explanatory variables for corruption advanced in the
literature. Column (3) adds a measure of ethnic fractionalization (from
Alesina et al., 2003), democracy (from the Polity IV database), and a full set
of legal origin dummies. Consistent with Treisman (2000), we ﬁnd that
democracies tend to be less corrupt (signiﬁcant at the 10% level). While the
regression does suggest that ethnic fragmentation is associated with more
corruption (Mauro, 1995), this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. Despite
the inclusion of these important determinants of corruption, the KKM index
retains its signiﬁcant U-shape with respect to log ‘‘Executive Tenure.’’28 We
27While we have also experimented with a cubic polynomial in stability in the regressions,
none of the coeﬃcients in log ‘‘Executive Tenure,’’ its square or its cube show up as statistically
signiﬁcant. Given the limited number of data points in the regression, it does not appear
practical to attempt to ﬁt a cubic speciﬁcation.
28The U-shape remains robust if we add the ethnic fractionalization, democracy, or legal
origin dummies into the regression separately; regressions available on request.
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add in column (4) a set of variables associated with economic rents,
proposed by Ades and Di Tella (1999). Following their lead, we control
for fuel and ore exports (normalized by total exports) to capture the
availability of expropriable rents, while we proxy for the degree of competi-
tion that the domestic economy is exposed to with the value of imports
normalized by GDP. Column (5) adds several variables capturing character-
istics of political systems. Following Persson et al. (2003), we include an
indicator variable for whether legislative seats are allocated under a plurality
vote rule, which in principle promotes more accountability from individual
politicians and should thus reduce corrupt behavior.29 We also control for
inverse district magnitude (number of electoral districts divided by seats),
where the intuition is that smaller districts help to improve accountability.
Last but not least, we include a measure for presidentialism, following
Kunicova’s (2005) argument that presidential systems tend to be associated
with more corruption. The results in Table 1a conﬁrm that controlling for
these additional determinants does not detract from the signiﬁcance of the
U-shape with respect to executive tenure.
We subject our central ﬁnding to a series of robustness tests in the
remaining columns. Given the small number of observations in these cross-
section regressions, a key concern would be whether any outliers or
inﬂuential observations might be driving our results. Column (6) demon-
strates that the U-shape remains robust even when we drop those observa-
tions that are deemed potentially inﬂuential for the coeﬃcient estimates
under Cook’s distance criterion (Cook, 1977), which recommends further
exploring observations for which the Cook distance metric exceeds 4/
(sample size).30 Column (7) examines what happens when we use a shorter
10-year window in computing executive tenure (the auxillary controls in this
regression are 10-year averages over 1992–2001, the same years covered by
the tenure window). We continue to obtain a U-shape, although the
coeﬃcient on squared stability is now just marginally insigniﬁcant at the
10% level. It is worth noting too that the point estimates on the coeﬃcients
of log ‘‘Executive Tenure’’ and its square are both smaller in magnitude
(attenuated toward zero) when compared with the corresponding full
speciﬁcation in column (5). This is consistent with the interpretation that
the tenure measure constructed with the 10-year window is subject to more
classical measurement error, and that a suﬃciently long window is necessary
29Our results are similar if we use a more continuous measure of plurality that equals 1 if all
seats are won under plurality rule; 2/3 if a majority of seats are won under plurality rule but
some are allocated under proportional representation (PR) rules; 1/3 if a majority of seats are
allocated under PR with a minority won by a plurality vote; and 0 if all legislative seats are
allocated under PR rules.
30Our results hold when alternative measures of inﬂuence are used to trim the dataset, such as
the DFITS metric (Welsch and Kuh, 1977), Welsch distance (Welsch, 1982), or the COVRATIO
criterion (Belsley et al., 1980).
to compute average tenure more precisely.31 We return in column (8) to the
use of a 20-year window, but construct our tenure measure with a window
(1986–2005) that overlaps contemporaneously with the corruption variables
on the left-hand side. We once again ﬁnd a robust U-shaped pattern, similar
to the full speciﬁcation using a lagged window instead. (The controls in this
speciﬁcation are averages over 2002–2005, or 2002–2004 when 2005 data are
not available; the results are similar using 1986–2005 averages.) Finally,
column (9) veriﬁes that our central ﬁndings are not aﬀected when we run the
regressions using average tenure in years (instead of log tenure). That said,
our preferred speciﬁcations are those that use log tenure, because the tenure
measures are by construction proportional to the reciprocal of the number of
changes of chief executive and thus display a lot of right skew.32
Table 1b conﬁrms that the U-shaped relationship between corruption and
log ‘‘Executive Tenure’’ continues to hold with other leading corruption
indices. We perform here the same regression speciﬁcations in Table 1a using
the CPI and the ICRG mean scores as dependent variables instead (for
expositional brevity, the table does not report the coeﬃcients on the
auxiliary controls). Using the CPI scores in the top panel, the U-shape
with respect to log ‘‘Executive Tenure’’ remains a consistent feature of the
data despite the smaller number of CPI observations. While we do lose
statistical signiﬁcance on the squared stability term when we experiment with
a 10-year window [column (7)] or a contemporaneous window [column (8)],
this does not detract much from the central message of a U-shape with
respect to stability with an interior turning point. Our central results also
hold with the ICRG mean scores (bottom panel). Although the results
weaken a little as we move toward the full speciﬁcation in column (5), and
when we trim the dataset using the Cook distance criterion in column (6), the
point estimates remain consistent with a U-shape. Overall, the strength of
the U-shape is quite remarkable, especially in light of the small cross-section
sample size and the extensive set of control variables used.
Table 2 repeats our cross-section regression exercise using ‘‘Party Tenure’’
as the measure of stability instead. We once again ﬁnd evidence of a
U-shaped pattern, particularly between the KKM corruption index and
log ‘‘Party Tenure’’ (top panel). Not surprisingly, the implied turning point
corresponds to a longer average tenure compared with Table 1a [equal to
31Not surprisingly, when we use an even shorter ﬁve-year window for computing average
tenure, the coeﬃcients on stability and its square are even further attenuated toward zero and no
longer statistically signiﬁcant. Note also that if we include countries that gained independence
after 1982 by calculating average tenure using a truncated window starting in their year of
independence, we ﬁnd a similar attenuation in the coeﬃcients of stability and its square, once
again suggesting that the shortened window results in an average tenure measure that is more
noisy.
32We have in eﬀect been penalizing ourselves by using log tenure, as the U-shaped relationship
between corruption and stability is even more statistically signiﬁcant when tenure is left un-
logged (results available on request).
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16.38 years in our full speciﬁcation in column (5), or 11.70 years in column
(6) when trimming inﬂuential observations using Cook’s distance criterion],
reﬂecting the higher frequency of turnover in individual chief executives
compared with changes in the party in power.33 It is also reassuring that our
coeﬃcients on average party tenure and its square are most precisely
estimated when we parse our sample down in column (6) to omit potentially
inﬂuential observations. Our results are slightly weaker when the CPI mean
score is used (middle panel), with the coeﬃcient on the squared party tenure
term tending to drop out of the range of conventional statistical signiﬁcance
in several speciﬁcations. In the bottom panel with the ICRG mean score, we
generally ﬁnd favorable evidence of a U-shaped relationship with respect to
log ‘‘Party Tenure,’’ although this is not statistically signiﬁcant in column (5)
with the full set of control variables.
Figure 2 neatly summarizes this relationship between corruption and the
average tenure measures. The vertical axis in Figure 2A plots the residuals
from the KKM index after controlling for all the right-hand-side variables in
our column (5) speciﬁcation, except for log ‘‘Executive Tenure’’ and its
square. Figure 2B does the same for the log ‘‘Party Tenure’’ measure. Both
the quadratic ﬁt and a non-parametric kernel regression clearly illustrate the
non-monotonic pattern between corruption and stability, with corruption
being on average higher in countries that exhibit either very high or very low
incumbent tenure lengths, and being on average lower in countries in an
intermediate range of political stability.34
Our next step is to analyze the results when pooling together the
observations from each individual year (between 1996 and 2005). For this,
we run ordinary least-squares regressions of the form
Corrupit ¼ ba  Stabi;t1 þ ba2  ðStabi;t1Þ2 þ bXXi;t1 þDt þ ni þ eit; ð8Þ
where i indexes country, and t indexes year. We run all regressions with year
ﬁxed eﬀects, Dt, because both the KKM and CPI indices are normalized in
each year and thus cannot be compared cardinally across years. We use one-
year lagged values for all the explanatory variables, including our measures
of political stability, in order to reduce the possibility of reverse causality.
(As before, Xi,t 1 denotes a set of additional control variables. Regression
results using contemporaneous instead of lagged control variables are similar
and available on request.) Note that our average tenure measures for each
33The relatively lower Monte Carlo probability of an interior turning point is a consequence
of this longer average party tenure, because the turning point is located closer to the upper
bound of the (0, 20) interval.
34In Figure 2B, the kernel regression appears to suggest that there is a ﬁnal downward-sloping
arm to the non-monotonic relationship at the highest levels of average party tenure, as our
theory would predict in the case where g is suﬃciently large (diminishing returns do not set in
too rapidly in the accumulation process for resources). We do not wish to over-emphasize this
point, however, given the limited data points available.
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Figure 2. The U-shape between corruption and average incumbent tenure
(cross-section). (A) Log executive tenure. (B) Log party tenure.
Notes: (A) is based on regression (5) in Table 1a, while (B) is based on regression (5) in
Table 2 (KKM panel). The kernel regressions use a Guassian kernel function, with band-
width¼ 0.25 and 300 gridpoints. Sample excludes all countries not independent by 1982,
as well as ‘‘CHE.’’
year are now calculated using a lagged 20-year moving window. Because the
earliest window used is 1976–1995 (to calculate average tenure leading up to
1996), we retain only those countries in our dataset that were independent by
1976; as before, we also drop the Swiss observation. Last but not least, we
allow for within-country correlation in the residuals (induced by the country-
speciﬁc error term, ni), and therefore report robust standard errors clustered
by country. (We present an alternative speciﬁcation with country ﬁxed eﬀects
when we turn to our dynamic panel estimation later below.)
Table 3 presents the results when the measure of stability is log ‘‘Executive
Tenure.’’ Column (1) is a minimum speciﬁcation run with the KKM index as
the dependent variable and with only year ﬁxed eﬀects as additional
controls, while column (2) includes the entire set of control variables that
we saw in the full speciﬁcation in column (5) of Tables 1 and 2. Both columns
demonstrate that the U-shape between corruption and average executive
tenure continues to hold in the pooled sample, with a turning point that is
comparable to that from the prior cross-section regressions. [The results are
similarly strong with more parsimonious sets of auxiliary controls such as in
columns (2)–(4) of Tables 1 and 2.]
We extend the analysis in column (3) to test the predictions from
Proposition 2 relating to the bargaining strength of the incumbent, s. To
see its eﬀects on the U-shaped relationship between corruption and stability,
we introduce s into the regression and also interact it with both stability and
its square:
Corrupit ¼ ba  Stabi;t1 þ ba2  ðStabi;t1Þ2 þ bssi þ ba;s  siStabi;t1
þ ba2;s  siðStabi;t1Þ2 þ bXXi;t1 þDt þ ni þ eit: ð9Þ
We consider two possible proxies for s. We ﬁrst use a measure of the
regulatory barriers to starting a business, from the World Bank’s Doing
Business database, which is based on the data methodology developed by
Djankov et al. (2002). Speciﬁcally, this s proxy is the number of days
(averaged over 2003–2005, and rescaled to lie between 0 and 1) needed to set
up a new business following all oﬃcial procedures. In principle, by imposing
high and costly barriers to entry, an incumbent is in a position to extract a
higher share of the rents enjoyed by the private sector, as ﬁrms will have to
make more concessions to circumvent such regulatory hold-up. A second s
proxy that we consider is the ‘‘Regulatory Quality’’ governance index from
KKM.35 Constructed in much the same way as KKM’s ‘‘Control of
Corruption’’ index, this measure aggregates institutional assessments of
country government’s ability to ‘‘formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development’’
35We thank a referee for suggesting this alternative proxy for the political incumbent’s bar-
gaining power.
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(KKM, p. 4). We use the negative of this index as an alternative proxy for
governmental regulatory hold-up.36
While these proxies are admittedly imperfect, the results are encouraging.
Column (3) presents the regressions using the ‘‘Days’’ proxy. First of all, it
conﬁrms that the basic U-shaped pattern with respect to ‘‘Executive Tenure’’
still holds.37 Furthermore, the results are consistent with the comparative
statics in Proposition 2: the coeﬃcient on the interaction term between log
‘‘Executive Tenure’’ and our s proxy is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. To be fully precise, the net interaction eﬀect between these
two variables is given by the empirical cross-derivative of corruption with
respect to stability and s, which is equal to ba;s þ 2ba2;s(log ‘‘Executive
Tenure’’). This empirical cross-derivative is indeed positive when evaluated
at the median value of log ‘‘Executive Tenure’’ in the regression sample, and
we can formally reject the null hypothesis that this net interaction eﬀect is
equal to zero ( p-value¼ 0.002). This result is best illustrated in a diagram:
Figure 3A shows that when the value of ‘‘Days’’ is increased, the U-shaped
curve between the corruption residuals and stability is shifted up, with this
shift being more pronounced at higher levels of executive tenure. Thus, an
increase in the bargaining power of the incumbent generates a larger increase
in corruption at higher levels of stability.38 Using a one-year lag of the
‘‘Regulatory Quality’’ index as our s proxy instead in column (5), we obtain
very similar results: the interaction coeﬃcient between the s proxy and log
‘‘Executive Tenure’’ is positive and signiﬁcant, and we also reject the null
hypothesis of a zero net interaction eﬀect at the 10% level ( p-value¼ 0.078).
We explore in columns (4) and (6) a means to exploit the panel structure of
our dataset more extensively, in a way that also helps to allay concerns over
potential endogeneity issues arising from unobserved country ﬁxed char-
acteristics or reverse causality. Consider the following model:
Corrupit ¼ ba  Stabi;t1 þ ba2  ðStabi;t1Þ2 þ ba;s  siStabi;t1
þ ba2;s  siðStabi;t1Þ2 þ bXXi;t1 þDt þDi þ eit; ð10Þ
which is similar to (9), except that we have now included Di as a country
ﬁxed eﬀect. Estimating (10) using conventional ﬁxed eﬀects is likely to lead
to biased coeﬃcient estimates, because our key right-hand-side variable,
the stability of the political incumbent, as well as country income per capita,
36As with the KKM corruption index, we drop those ‘‘Regulatory Quality’’ observations that
are based on fewer than three component indices.
37For all speciﬁcations where the interaction eﬀect with a s proxy is considered, the turning
point reported is that obtained when setting the s proxy to its median value in the regression
sample.
38These tests for Proposition 2 are only slightly weaker when run in the cross-section analysis.
The coeﬃcients there have similar signs, although signiﬁcance levels are lower given the small
sample size in cross-section.
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Figure 3. The U-shape between corruption and average incumbent tenure (pooled
observations). (A) Log executive tenure. (B) Log party tenure.
Notes: (A) is based on the regression in Table 3, column (3), while (B) is based on Table 4,
column (3). Sample excludes countries not independent by 1976, as well as ‘‘CHE.’’ Re-
siduals are obtained by regressing the KKM corruption measure against all right-hand-
side variables except the relevant log tenure measure, log tenure sq., (log tenure)  (Days),
and (log tenure sq.)  (Days). Fitted lines are plotted at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile
in sample values of Days, respectively.
are both plausibly going to depend on the level of observed corruption in
preceding periods. In other words, the error term, eit, is not strictly exogenous
as required under ﬁxed eﬀects estimation [Corr(eit,Stabi,tþ s) 6¼ 0, for s  0].
To address this, we perform a dynamic panel GMM estimation using lagged
levels of corruption, stability, stability squared, stability interacted with
‘‘Days,’’ stability squared interacted with ‘‘Days,’’ ‘‘Days,’’ log income per
capita, and log income per capita squared as instruments in the ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced version of (10) for these right-hand-side variables involving
stability and income per capita (Arellano and Bond, 1991). At the same
time, we also use lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences of these variables as instruments in
the levels version of (10), to improve the eﬃciency of the estimates, and allay
concerns related to weak instruments when the right-hand-side variables are
persistent (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).39
This dynamic panel GMM estimation helps to reinforce the message from
the prior OLS regressions: in column (4), we continue to obtain a statistically
signiﬁcant quadratic U-shaped relationship linking corruption and average
tenure. The estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction between log ‘‘Executive
Tenure’’ and ‘‘Days’’ remains positive, although this is not signiﬁcant; that
said, we do reject the null hypothesis of a zero net interaction eﬀect at the 10%
level ( p-value¼ 0.064).40 We ﬁnd mixed results when running the dynamic
panel estimation using the ‘‘Regulatory Quality’’ proxy in column (6): we lose
signiﬁcance on the U-shape with respect to log ‘‘Executive Tenure,’’ but
obtain a positive and signiﬁcant net interaction eﬀect between log ‘‘Executive
Tenure’’ and our s proxy (we reject the null hypothesis of a zero net
interaction eﬀect; p-value¼ 0.001).
The remainder of Table 3 provides some reassurance that our results are
similarly valid with both the CPI and the ICRG indices. We present the OLS
and dynamic panel speciﬁcations using lagged ‘‘Regulatory Quality’’ as the
s proxy as this has slightly more explanatory power for the dependent
corruption variable when compared with the ‘‘Days’’ proxy.41 (The results
using the ‘‘Days’’ proxy are similar and available on request.) The evidence
points overall toward a U-shape with respect to log ‘‘Executive Tenure,’’
39We implement this using the xtabond2 Stata command developed in Roodman (2006).
40Several basic speciﬁcation tests (not reported in Table 3) verify that the key underlying
assumptions for the dynamic panel model – including the requirement that eit be uncorrelated
with past values of the right-hand-side variables – are not violated. We reject the null hypothesis
of no ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the residuals at the 5% level ( p-
value¼ 0.023). At the same time, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial
correlation ( p-value¼ 0.104). The Sargan–Hansen statistic is small [w2(183)¼ 73.41]; hence, we
cannot reject the identifying restrictions for the validity of the instruments ( p-value¼ 1.000),
subject to the caveat that this test tends to be weak when the set of instruments is large. We also
reach similar conclusions with these diagnostic tests in the column (6) dynamic panel GMM
speciﬁcation using the ‘‘Regulatory Quality’’ proxy.
41The KKM ‘‘Regulatory Quality’’ index is only available every two years from 1996 to 2002.
When necessary, we associate the index value for each year with the next year as well (e.g. we
associate the index value for 1996 with 1997 as well).
as well as a positive interaction eﬀect with the s proxy (although the results
are less signiﬁcant in the ﬁnal column that subjects the ICRG index to the
dynamic panel estimation).42
For completeness, Table 4 conducts the parallel exercise using ‘‘Party
Tenure’’ as the measure of incumbent stability, and we obtain strikingly
similar results. The coeﬃcients on log ‘‘Party Tenure’’ and its square
continue to paint a consistent story regarding the non-monotonic relation-
ship between corruption and average tenure. Figure 3B illustrates this
U-shaped pattern, and also makes evident the impact of ‘‘Days’’ in
increasing corruption, particularly at higher levels of stability.
We thus conclude that the evidence strongly supports the presence of a
U-shaped relationship between corruption and stability, when stability is
measured by the historically observed average tenures of either the chief
executive or the party in power.
3.2.2 Legislative Majority. We turn brieﬂy then to consider the empirical
evidence when political stability is measured instead by the strength of the
incumbent’s position in the legislature, as proxied by ‘‘Majority.’’ These
results are presented in Table 5, which summarizes ﬁndings from both cross-
section and pooled regressions.
Reassuringly, our key conclusions are broadly unchanged. In the baseline
cross-section KKM regression in column (1) that includes only ‘‘Majority’’
and its square as explanatory variables, we already ﬁnd a signiﬁcant U-
shaped pattern with an interior turning point, which suggests that corrup-
tion bottoms out when the incumbent’s ‘‘Majority’’ is around 0.75 (when the
ruling coalition holds about three-quarters of the legislative seats). (As
before, the right-hand-side variables in these cross-section regressions are
20-year lagged averages between 1982 and 2001; hence, we include only
countries that were independent before 1982.) This non-monotonic pattern
in the cross-section persists with more parsimonious sets of auxiliary
controls, or when we drop potentially inﬂuential observations using Cook’s
distance criterion (regressions not shown). When we pool together all the
yearly observations and use one-year lags of ‘‘Majority’’ as our key
explanatory variable following the speciﬁcation in equation (8) with a full
set of controls, the U-shape loses statistical signiﬁcance [column (2)].43
Nevertheless, statistical signiﬁcance is restored when we further include the
‘‘Days’’ proxy in column (3) following the speciﬁcation in equation (9). We
moreover ﬁnd favorable evidence of a positive net interaction eﬀect between
‘‘Majority’’ and our ‘‘Days’’ proxy for s (we reject the null hypothesis of a
42Our results also hold in speciﬁcations that use more parsimonious sets of control variables
(regressions not shown).
43We do not drop the newly independent countries or Switzerland, because the one-year lags
of ‘‘Majority’’ are a valid measure of legislative strength in these countries. Our results do not
change substantially if we drop these countries.
T
A
B
L
E
4
T
H
E
U
-S
H
A
P
E
B
E
T
W
E
E
N
C
O
R
R
U
P
T
IO
N
A
N
D
A
V
E
R
A
G
E
P
A
R
T
Y
T
E
N
U
R
E
(D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
:
A
N
N
U
A
L
C
O
R
R
U
P
T
IO
N
S
C
O
R
E
S
,
1
9
9
6
–
2
0
0
5
,
U
N
B
A
L
A
N
C
E
D
P
A
N
E
L
)
C
o
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
in
d
ex
:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
K
K
M
K
K
M
K
K
M
K
K
M
K
K
M
K
K
M
C
P
I
C
P
I
IC
R
G
IC
R
G
s
p
ro
x
y
:
–
–
‘‘
D
a
y
s’
’
‘‘
D
a
y
s’
’
‘‘
R
eg
’’
‘‘
R
eg
’’
‘‘
R
eg
’’
‘‘
R
eg
’’
‘‘
R
eg
’’
‘‘
R
eg
’’
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
G
M
M
O
L
S
G
M
M
O
L
S
G
M
M
O
L
S
G
M
M
M
in
.
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
F
u
ll
sp
ec
.
L
n
P
a
rt
y
T
en
u
re

1
.0
5
2


0
.7
7
2



1
.5
9
3



1
.3
0
0



0
.4
5
4


0
.4
7
3

0
.6
5
9


1
.0
1
4



0
.5
5
5

0
.9
9
6

(0
.5
0
4
)
(0
.2
9
3
)
(0
.4
2
8
)
(0
.4
6
1
)
(0
.1
8
5
)
(0
.3
9
9
)
(0
.2
5
8
)
(0
.3
5
0
)
(0
.3
6
0
)
(0
.5
5
3
)
(L
n
P
a
rt
y
T
en
u
re
)2
0
.2
5
8

0
.1
6
4

0
.3
3
1


0
.2
7
0

0
.1
0
9

0
.1
2
5
0
.1
5
6

0
.2
5
8

0
.1
4
6

0
.2
8
8

(0
.1
3
1
)
(0
.0
7
2
)
(0
.1
0
9
)
(0
.1
3
0
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.1
1
1
)
(0
.0
6
6
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.1
3
8
)
s
p
ro
x
y

3
.8
7
0


–

0
.2
6
6
–

0
.4
7
6
–

1
.1
0
4


–
(1
.0
6
5
)
(0
.2
4
5
)
(0
.2
8
8
)
(0
.3
8
9
)
(L
n
P
a
rt
y
T
en
u
re
)

s
4
.4
4
7


0
.1
6
1
0
.6
0
2

0
.3
6
9

0
.9
5
1


0
.1
9
1
1
.6
2
5


0
.6
6
1


(1
.2
2
4
)
(0
.6
1
7
)
(0
.2
8
0
)
(0
.1
4
6
)
(0
.3
4
9
)
(0
.1
7
8
)
(0
.4
4
3
)
(0
.2
3
5
)
(L
n
P
a
rt
y
T
en
u
re
)2

s

0
.9
6
0


0
.1
1
3

0
.1
1
0

0
.1
0
3


0
.2
1
6


0
.0
3
1

0
.3
8
3



0
.1
7
5

(0
.3
0
7
)
(0
.2
3
7
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.0
6
0
)
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
7
3
)
(0
.1
2
6
)
(0
.0
9
5
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
s.
(n
)
8
7
1
5
6
4
5
2
8
5
2
8
5
0
0
5
0
0
5
6
3
5
6
3
7
2
3
7
2
3
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
3
7
9
4
8
7
8
7
9
4
9
4
8
7
8
7
9
1
9
1
R
2
0
.0
3
0
.8
8
0
.8
9
–
0
.9
1
–
0
.9
1
–
0
.7
0
–
p
-V
a
lu
e
(I
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
¼
0
)
–
–
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
0
0
0
.5
6
5
0
.0
0
1
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
0
1
0
.3
1
0
T
u
rn
in
g
p
o
in
t
(i
n
y
ea
rs
)
7
.6
7
1
0
.5
1
1
2
.1
7
8
.9
7
9
.2
8
6
.5
3
8
.5
6
7
.6
2
7
.3
7
5
.7
8
M
C
p
ro
b
.A
(0
,
2
0
)
0
.9
5
1
0
.9
1
3
0
.8
5
7
0
.9
4
8
0
.9
4
4
0
.9
2
2
0
.9
9
1
0
.9
4
5
0
.9
9
8
0
.9
8
7
Y
ea
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
co
m
e,
in
c.
sq
.,
R
eg
.
d
u
m
m
ie
s
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
E
th
.
F
ra
c.
,
D
em
o
c.
,
L
eg
a
l
o
ri
g
in
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
E
co
n
o
m
ic
re
n
ts
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
sy
st
em
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
w
it
h
 ,

,
an
d


d
en
o
ti
n
g
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
10
%
,
5%
,
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
In
al
l
O
L
S
co
lu
m
n
s,
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
co
u
n
tr
y.
S
am
p
le
in
cl
u
d
es
o
n
ly
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
b
ef
o
re
19
76
,
an
d
‘‘
C
H
E
’’
is
d
ro
p
p
ed
.
R
ig
h
t-
h
an
d
-s
id
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
(e
xc
ep
t
co
u
n
tr
y
ﬁ
xe
d
fa
ct
o
rs
,
et
h
n
ic
fr
ac
ti
o
n
al
iz
at
io
n
,
an
d
‘‘
D
ay
s’
’)
ar
e
o
n
e-
ye
ar
la
gs
.
T
h
e
p-
va
lu
e
is
re
p
o
rt
ed
fo
r
a
t-
te
st
o
f
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
n
et
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
eﬀ
ec
t
b
et
w
ee
n
ln
‘‘
P
ar
ty
T
en
u
re
’’
an
d
th
e
s
p
ro
xy
eq
u
al
s
0,
w
h
en
ev
al
u
at
ed
at
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
va
lu
e
o
f
ln
‘‘
P
ar
ty
T
en
u
re
’’
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
o
n
sa
m
p
le
.
T
h
e
tu
rn
in
g
p
o
in
t
fo
r
co
lu
m
n
s
w
it
h
th
es
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
te
rm
s
is
ev
al
u
at
ed
at
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
va
lu
e
o
f
th
e
s
p
ro
xy
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
o
n
sa
m
p
le
.T
h
e
la
st
ro
w
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
th
at
th
e
tu
rn
in
g
p
o
in
t
li
es
in
th
e
in
te
ri
o
r
o
f
(0
,2
0
),
b
as
ed
o
n
1,
00
0
M
o
n
te
C
ar
lo
d
ra
w
s
fr
o
m
th
e
m
u
lt
iv
ar
ia
te
n
o
rm
al
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
.
T
A
B
L
E
5
T
H
E
U
-S
H
A
P
E
B
E
T
W
E
E
N
C
O
R
R
U
P
T
IO
N
A
N
D
L
E
G
IS
L
A
T
IV
E
M
A
JO
R
IT
Y
C
o
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
in
d
ex
:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
K
K
M
K
K
M
K
K
M
C
P
I
C
P
I
C
P
I
IC
R
G
IC
R
G
IC
R
G
s
p
ro
x
y
:
–
–
‘‘
D
a
y
s’
’
–
–
‘‘
D
a
y
s’
’
–
–
‘‘
D
a
y
s’
’
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
P
o
o
le
d
P
o
o
le
d
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
P
o
o
le
d
P
o
o
le
d
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
P
o
o
le
d
P
o
o
le
d
In
d
.
b
y
1
9
8
2
In
d
.
b
y
1
9
8
2
In
d
.
b
y
1
9
8
2
M
a
jo
ri
ty

5
.7
2
1


0
.7
5
6

2
.9
7
6



4
.2
0
0

0
.7
1
2

3
.7
7
1


4
.8
0
8

0
.4
0
9

6
.5
4
0


(2
.3
0
5
)
(0
.5
7
6
)
(1
.0
4
8
)
(3
.3
7
9
)
(0
.8
3
8
)
(1
.5
4
3
)
(3
.9
4
5
)
(1
.1
9
2
)
(2
.0
5
9
)
(M
a
jo
ri
ty
)2
3
.5
7
1

0
.2
4
4
1
.7
7
3

2
.2
2
2
0
.2
3
0
2
.5
2
9

2
.7
5
4
0
.1
6
1
4
.5
9
1


(1
.5
4
7
)
(0
.4
4
7
)
(0
.8
5
1
)
(2
.4
6
1
)
(0
.6
5
4
)
(1
.2
9
7
)
(2
.7
2
8
)
(0
.8
9
4
)
(1
.6
5
8
)
s
p
ro
x
y

2
.5
8
4


3
.4
3
0


7
.3
2
9


(0
.9
9
5
)
(1
.4
5
4
)
(2
.0
5
9
)
(M
a
jo
ri
ty
)

s
8
.5
2
4

1
1
.8
6
7

2
3
.3
5
9


(3
.4
5
9
)
(5
.3
1
3
)
(7
.1
2
3
)
(M
a
jo
ri
ty
)2

s

5
.8
1
6


8
.8
2
6


1
6
.8
3
3


(2
.9
0
7
)
(4
.5
5
5
)
(5
.8
4
4
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
s.
(n
)
1
0
8
6
7
8
6
4
0
7
9
7
5
9
7
3
9
9
7
9
0
6
8
6
0
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
0
8
1
1
4
1
0
6
7
9
1
0
7
1
0
1
9
7
1
0
8
1
0
1
R
2
0
.8
7
0
.8
8
0
.8
8
0
.9
0
0
.8
6
0
.8
7
0
.7
6
0
.6
5
0
.6
6
p
-V
a
lu
e
(I
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
¼
0
)
–
–
0
.0
0
7
–
–
0
.0
2
2
–
–
0
.0
0
2
T
u
rn
in
g
p
o
in
t
0
.8
0
1
.5
5
0
.9
9
0
.9
5
1
.5
5
0
.8
6
0
.8
7
1
.2
7
0
.7
5
M
C
p
ro
b
.A
(0
,1
)
0
.9
3
7
0
.3
3
5
0
.5
1
0
0
.6
4
4
0
.5
0
3
0
.6
8
1
0
.7
6
1
0
.7
6
9
0
.8
9
9
Y
ea
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
In
co
m
e,
in
c.
sq
.,
R
eg
.
D
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
E
th
.
F
ra
c.
,
D
em
o
c.
,
L
eg
a
l
o
ri
g
in
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
E
co
n
o
m
ic
re
n
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
sy
st
em
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
w
it
h
 ,

,
a
n
d


d
en
o
ti
n
g
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
.
In
a
ll
‘‘
P
o
o
le
d
’’
co
lu
m
n
s,
th
es
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
co
u
n
tr
y
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
in
th
e
‘‘
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
’’
co
lu
m
n
s
is
th
e
m
ea
n
co
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
sc
o
re
o
v
er
2
0
0
2
–
2
0
0
5
,
w
h
il
e
ri
g
h
t-
h
a
n
d
-s
id
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
a
v
er
a
g
es
o
v
er
1
9
8
2
–
2
0
0
1
.
In
th
e
‘‘
P
o
o
le
d
’’
co
lu
m
n
s,
th
e
ri
g
h
t-
h
a
n
d
-s
id
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
o
n
e-
y
ea
r
la
g
s.
T
h
e
p
-v
a
lu
e
is
re
p
o
rt
ed
fo
r
a
t-
te
st
o
f
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
n
et
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
eﬀ
ec
t
b
et
w
ee
n
‘‘
M
a
jo
ri
ty
’’
a
n
d
th
e
s
p
ro
x
y
eq
u
a
ls
0
,
w
h
en
ev
a
lu
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
v
a
lu
e
o
f
‘‘
M
a
jo
ri
ty
’’
in
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
sa
m
p
le
.
F
o
r
th
e
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
v
o
lv
in
g
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
eﬀ
ec
ts
,
th
e
tu
rn
in
g
p
o
in
t
w
it
h
re
sp
ec
t
to
‘‘
M
a
jo
ri
ty
’’
is
ev
a
lu
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
s
p
ro
x
y
in
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
sa
m
p
le
.
T
h
e
la
st
ro
w
o
f
th
e
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
th
a
t
th
e
tu
rn
in
g
p
o
in
t
li
es
in
th
e
in
te
ri
o
r
o
f
(0
,1
),
b
a
se
d
o
n
1
,0
0
0
M
o
n
te
C
a
rl
o
d
ra
w
s
fr
o
m
th
e
m
u
lt
iv
a
ri
a
te
n
o
rm
a
l
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
co
eﬃ
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
zero net interaction eﬀect; p-value¼ 0.007). Repeating this exercise with the
other corruption indices in the remaining columns of Table 5, we ﬁnd that the
statistical signiﬁcance of our results generally weakens. That said, in the full
speciﬁcations where the interaction eﬀect of ‘‘Days’’ on stability is also
considered [columns (6) and (9)], we ﬁnd particularly strong evidence for a
U-shaped relationship linking corruption and ‘‘Majority.’’44 Moreover, we
again ﬁnd a positive net interaction eﬀect between stability and our ‘‘Days’’
proxy for the incumbent’s bargaining power [ p-value¼ 0.022 and 0.002,
respectively, in columns (6) and (9)].
3.3 Corruption and the Size of Government
Last but not least, we investigate the relationship between corruption and the
size of government, motivated by our earlier theoretical prediction (in Pro-
position 4) that this should also be a U-shaped pattern. The relationship
between these two variables has drawn some recent attention: Alesina and
Angeletos (2005), for instance, present a model in which a positive relation
between corruption and the size of government is taken as a premise, whereby
a larger government implies a larger scope for rent-seeking activities. How-
ever, this relationship has not been easy to verify empirically: Glaeser and
Saks (2006), for example, ﬁnd no signiﬁcant correlation between corruption
convictions and the size of government at the state level in the United States.
Understanding the nature of the relationship between these two variables is
clearly an important topic in its own right, given the implications it bears for
what an appropriate size of government might be in order to minimize the
incentives for public oﬃceholders to engage in corrupt activities.
As it turns out, we do ﬁnd some suggestive evidence of a U-shaped pattern
linking corruption and the size of government, as shown in Table 6. We use
total government consumption expenditures as a share of GDP, taken from
the WDI, to proxy for the size of government, as is standard in this litera-
ture. We focus ﬁrst on the cross-section regression speciﬁcations, because
this rids the analysis of budget cycle eﬀects that could confound inter-
pretation of the results by averaging the data over several years.
Column (1) reports a U-shaped pattern, signiﬁcant at the 1% level, be-
tween the mean KKM corruption score and the size of government when no
further controls are added. In this baseline speciﬁcation, corruption reaches
its minimum when the level of government expenditures sits at about 20% of
GDP. This turning point lies well within the range of government sizes
observed in the sample (between 0% and 50%). This relationship weakens
when we add in a full set of controls [column (2)], but is restored when we
44The Monte Carlo probability of the turning point lying in the interior of [0, 1] is relatively
small in columns (6) and (9), due to the fact that the point estimate of this turning point when
evaluated at the median value of ‘‘Days’’ is already close to the upper bound of this interval in
both these speciﬁcations.
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turn to the pooled speciﬁcation based on annual observations [column (3)].
When using the other corruption measures, we ﬁnd in general that the sta-
tistical signiﬁcance of any U-shape with respect to government size is strong
in the minimum baseline speciﬁcation, but weakens as we add further aux-
iliary controls. Overall though, the point estimates never overturn the basic
U-shaped relationship. Of note, throughout all speciﬁcations, the Monte
Carlo probability of the turning point lying in the interior of the relevant
[0, 50] range is large (always in excess of 0.9).
In sum, we ﬁnd some suggestive evidence that corruption is decreasing in
the size of government for countries where the level of these government
expenditures is low, but this relationship turns into a positively sloped one
over high ranges of government expenditures.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has investigated the relationship between the level of corruption
and the degree of instability to which political incumbents are exposed, both
from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Our theoretical framework
predicts that corruption and stability are related in a non-monotonic pattern
that approximates a U-shape, building on the interaction between the hor-
izon eﬀect, by which a less stable incumbent is more willing to embezzle, and
the demand eﬀect, according to which higher bribes will be oﬀered to a more
stable incumbent.
On the empirical side, we ﬁnd that the cross-country evidence displays a
U-shaped relationship between corruption and political stability, as meas-
ured by historically observed incumbent tenure lengths or by the legislative
majority of the government. This result is largely robust to the inclusion of
many political and economic control variables, as well as across various
estimation methods. We see this robustness as suggesting that cross-country
corruption perception indices do contain useful information beyond their
oft-noted correlation with GDP per capita. (It is hard to believe that the
non-linear relationships uncovered could be attributed to random noise.)
While the available empirical evidence supports the U-shaped prediction,
a natural next step will be to pursue tests to separately identify the horizon
and demand eﬀects within a common setting. In this regard, we believe that
turning to micro-level data is a promising direction along which to bridge
theory and empirics. Most encouragingly, some work based on Mexican
ﬁrm-level data on corruption has already tested our theory, with the pre-
liminary results being quite supportive (Gamboa-Cavazos et al., 2006). Our
hope is that further micro-level evidence will allow us to separately measure
diﬀerent types of corruption along the lines suggested by the theory, and we
intend to continue working in this direction as part of this research agenda.
As a ﬁnal note, it is worth highlighting some policy implications stemming
from our analysis. The horizon eﬀect suggests that the possibility of
re-election should be an important incentive in defusing an incumbent’s
tendency to embezzle. On the other hand, the demand eﬀect cautions that
long-standing incumbents are more liable to engage in long-term illicit li-
censing relations with private ﬁrms. When these two eﬀects are combined,
our theory implies that there is an optimal length of tenure at which the
marginal incentive to license more exactly oﬀsets the marginal disincentive
to engage in more embezzlement. This suggests that an electoral system in
which there is the possibility of re-election, but which nevertheless imposes
term limits on politicians, is well placed to approximate such an optimal
compromise between the horizon and demand eﬀects. In fact, the data
conﬁrm that the length of executive tenure that minimizes corruption – the
‘‘turning point’’ of the U-shape – is around eight years, remarkably close to
the term limits (two terms of four years) that are observed in practice in
many countries. Advertently or inadvertently, the designers of these electoral
institutions appear to have built in a system that balances oﬀ the horizon
and demand eﬀects highlighted in our analysis.
APPENDIX A
A.1. Corruption Perception Indices
KKM: From KKM’s (2006) ‘‘Control of Corruption’’ index, itself a com-
posite of diﬀerent corruption ratings aggregated by an unobserved compo-
nents methodology. On a scale of  2.5 to 2.5. The negative of the original
index is used, so that higher numbers correspond to more perceived cor-
ruption. Data are available for 1996–2002 at two-year intervals, and there-
after for 2002–2005 on an annual basis. We drop all observations that were
aggregated from less than three source indices. For the cross-section re-
gressions, the dependent variable is the mean KKM score from 2002 to 2005;
we restrict the sample to only those countries where all four years of data
were available.
CPI: From TI. The CPI is linearly rescaled from its original range of 0–10,
to a  2.5 to 2.5 scale, with higher numbers corresponding to more perceived
corruption. Data used are annual observations from 1996 to 2005. The CPI
is also based on corruption scores from diﬀerent agencies, but its aggrega-
tion methodology is non-parametric in nature, using only the ordinal ranks
of each country. We use only those data points that CPI aggregates based on
at least three sources; these are the data points that TI reports in its annual
ranking of countries. For the cross-section regressions, the dependent vari-
able is the mean score for only those countries for which four continuous
years of data were available for 2002–2005. (Year 2002 is the ﬁrst for which
CPI coverage exceeds 100 countries.)
ICRG: From the Political Risk Services Group, a commercial provider of
country risk assessments. The ICRG political risk-rating index contains a
subcomponent for corruption, which is what we use. The original ICRG
corruption index is coded on a scale of 0–6, and is available on a monthly
basis. We linearly rescaled the scores to lie on a  2.5 to 2.5 interval with a
higher score corresponding to more corruption, and took the simple average
of monthly scores to obtain an annual score (for each country, this is
computed only for those years in which all 12 months of corruption data are
available). For the cross-section regressions, we use the mean ICRG score
for 2002–2005, where only countries with all four years of data are included
in the sample. For more details on the ICRG methodology, see: http://
www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx
A.2. Political Stability
Average tenure: The historically observed average tenure (in years) for po-
litical incumbents over a 20-year window. Calculated as 20/(1þ x), where x
is the number of political changes observed in the preceding 20-year window.
TABLE A1 SUMMARY STATISTICS
N Min. Median Max. Mean Std. dev.
A. Corruption perception indices
KKM (2002–2005) 166  2.465 0.386 1.748 0.097 1.027
CPI (2002–2005) 102  2.338 0.65 1.788 0.231 1.197
ICRG (2002–2005) 140  2.5 0.616 2.5 0.422 0.949
B. Political stability measures
Avg Executive Tenure (1982–2001) 162 0.952 4.25 20 5.967 5.106
Avg Party Tenure (1982–2001) 162 1.333 5 20 7.773 6.217
Majority (1982–2001) 160 0.303 0.760 1 0.734 0.181
C. Other variables
Log real GDP per capita (1982–2001) 152 6.222 8.295 10.411 8.332 1.106
Ethnic Fractionalization 163 0 0.484 0.930 0.454 0.258
Democracy (1982–2001) 156 0 3.053 10 4.105 3.768
Imports/GDP (%, 1982–2001) 162 4.993 36.284 176.450 41.759 23.353
Fuel/Total Exports (%, 1982–2001) 154 0.001 3.709 96.538 16.068 26.009
Ore/Total Exports (%, 1982–2001) 155 0.004 2.719 75.145 8.777 14.662
Plurality (1982–2001) 149 0 1 1 0.685 0.448
Inverse District Magnitude (1982–2001) 142 0.007 0.211 1.429 0.438 0.412
Presidentialism (1982–2001) 162 0 0.85 1 0.648 0.413
Days to start a business (2003–2005) 134 2 40.5 203 50.117 37.210
Regulatory Quality (1996–2005) 134  1.854  0.096 2.386  0.091 0.948
Government Spending/GDP
(%, 1982–2001)
159 4.449 16.234 43.280 16.653 6.420
Notes: In Panel A, for each corruption index, only those countries with all four years of data
available are included when calculating the mean corruption score from 2002–2005. Summary
statistics for variables in Panels B and C are for the sample of countries for which the KKM
mean (2002–2005) score was computed.
We compute two separate average tenure measures for (i) individual chief
executives and (ii) the party in power (holding the seat of the chief executive).
The information on political changes was compiled from: http://
www.worldstatesmen.org. We checked the political chronologies from
WorldStatesmen.org for consistency against the August 2005 version of the
DPI. The DPI contains two variables ‘‘PRTYIN’’ and ‘‘EXECME’’ that
code, respectively, the number of years that the party of the chief executive
has been in power and the name of the party of the chief executive, as of
January 1 of each year from 1975 to 2004. These variables allow us to
identify years in which political changes occurred, although they are not
ideal because they do not pick up instances of extreme political volatility
when more than one change occurred in a year. Notwithstanding this, we
used these DPI variables as a cross-check. Reassuringly, few discrepancies
were found, and these were resolved by consulting additional sources on
political histories, such as the Zarate Political Collections.
Majority: From the DPI. Variable used is ‘‘MAJ,’’ which is the fraction of
seats in the legislature held by members of the governing coalition, as of
January 1 of each year.
A.3. Additional Variables
Real GDP per capita: From the World Bank WDI. Real PPP-adjusted GDP
per capita (in constant 2000 international dollars).
Ethnic fractionalization: From Alesina et al. (2003). Equal to 1 minus the
Herﬁndahl Index of population shares of ethnic groups within a country.
(This variable does not vary over time.)
Democracy: Polity IV democracy score, on a scale of 0–10. The reference
date for the annual observations in the Polity IV dataset is December 31 of
each year. We match these to the data corresponding to January 1 of the
following year for consistency with the DPI.
Fuel exports: From the WDI. Value of fuel exports as a percentage of total
merchandize exports.
Ore exports: From the WDI. Value of ore and metal exports as a per-
centage of total merchandize exports.
Imports: From the WDI. Imports of goods and services as a percentage of
GDP.
Presidentialism: Calculated from the DPI. The DPI variable ‘‘SYSTEM’’
codes political systems as: 0 for a direct presidential system; 1 for a strong
president elected by a legislative assembly; and 2 for a parliamentary system.
Our presidentialism variable is equal to (2 ‘‘SYSTEM’’)/2, so higher values
indicate more political power concentrated with the president.
Plurality: Equal to the ‘‘PLURALTY’’ variable from the DPI. Variable is
1 if a ﬁrst-past-the-post rule is used in elections to the legislature for at least
some seats. Variable is coded as 0 if all seats are determined by proportional
representation (PR) rules, or if elections are not free (all legislators are
appointed or there is no competition under one-party rule).
Inverse of district magnitude: Calculated as 1/‘‘MDMH’’. The ‘‘MDMH’’
variable is from the DPI, and is equal to the number of legislative seats per
electoral district.
Legal origin: From La Porta et al. (1999). Dummy variables for British,
French, Scandinavian, German, and socialist legal origin.
Region dummies: Following the World Bank’s classiﬁcations, dummy
variables for: East Asia and the Paciﬁc; East Europe and Central Asia;
Middle East and North America; South Asia; West Europe; North America;
Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America; and the Caribbean.
Days to start a business: Days required to start a business following all
formally required procedures. Mean taken over the years 2003–2005
(countries with less than three years of data are dropped). From Doing
Business: Benchmarking Business Regulations, a World Bank database.
Regulatory quality: From KKM (2006). The negative of the ‘‘Regulatory
Quality’’ index is used, so higher scores correspond to a business environ-
ment that is less favorable toward private sector ﬁrms. As with the ‘‘Control
of Corruption’’ index, we drop all observations aggregated on the basis of
fewer than three source indices.
Size of government: From the WDI. Total government consumption
expenditure as a share of GDP.
Year of independence: From the CIA World Fact Book.
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